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THE ROLE OF POSITIVE COMITY IN U.S. ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT AGAINST JAPANESE FIRMS: A MIXED
REVIEW
Matthew Cooper
Abstract: On October 7, 1999, the United States and Japan signed an antitrust
cooperation agreement. The agreement contains provisions for notification and
consultation, coordination and cooperation, and positive comity. These provisions
address Japanese sovereignty concerns arising from the unilateral application of U.S.
antitrust laws to the conduct of Japanese firms that occurs outside the territorial borders
of the United States. The agreement also addresses U.S. perceptions that Japanese
markets are closed to American businesses because it offers tools, other than unilateral
antitrust enforcement, to open Japanese markets to American businesses. However, the
positive comity provision does not proscribe unilateral antitrust enforcement. This
Comment analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of the positive comity provision and
recommends several improvements.
I. INTRODUCTION
While markets for goods and services extend beyond national
boundaries, antitrust laws regulating these markets are national in scope.1
This paradox presents a challenge to effective application of U.S. antitrust
laws to anticompetitive conduct occurring outside national borders.3
Cooperation between the United States and international competition
authorities is increasing. This is a welcome departure from previous U.S.
foreign antitrust enforcement policy that often "led to instances of sharp
conflict with other sovereigns."4  However, continued unilateral application
of U.S. antitrust laws to the conduct of Japanese firms occurring outside of
the United States continues to cause tension between the United States and
Japan. Additionally, some American politicians and industries view
unilateral antitrust enforcement as a necessary means to open Japanese
markets to U.S businesses.
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT OF THE INT'L COMPETITION POLICY ADVISORY COMM. TO
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR ANTITRUST 36 (2000) [hereinafter
FINAL REPORTI.
2 In this Comment, anticompetitive conduct is conduct that is prohibited by the Sherman Act and
Clayton Act. See infra Part IIA-B.
FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 36.
4 id.
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Despite the misgivings of several U.S. Senators,5 the United States
and Japan signed an antitrust cooperation agreement ("Cooperation
Agreement") on October 7, 1999.6 The Cooperation Agreement includes
provisions for notification and consultation, cooperation and coordination,
and positive comity.7 The positive comity provision in particular addresses
the top two concerns of both countries: U.S. market access in Japan and
Japanese sovereignty.
This Comment reviews the Cooperation Agreement. Part II provides
a brief overview of U.S. antitrust laws. Part III outlines the views of some
U.S. Senators and businesses toward Japanese markets and how unilateral
application of U.S. antitrust laws infringes upon Japanese sovereignty. Part
IV describes the history of formal efforts at cooperation by the United States
and Japan. Part V examines the strengths and weaknesses of the positive
comity provision of the Cooperation Agreement. Part VI provides
recommendations for strengthening the Cooperation Agreement's positive
comity provision.
II. OVERVIEW OF U.S. ANTITRUST LAWS AND THEIR APPLICATION TO
CONDUCT OCCURRING OUTSIDE U.S. TERRITORIAL BORDERS
An overview of two basic U.S. antitrust laws, the Sherman Act8 and
the Clayton Act,9 is necessary to understand how the application of these
laws l° to the conduct of Japanese firms causes tension between the United
States and Japan. I' Specifically, it is important to understand Section 1 of
5 Issues Relating to Int'l Antitrust Cooperation and Enforcement, Including Positive Comity
Agreements, the Flat Glass Industry, and Problems with the Japanese Market: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Antitrust, Business Rights, and Competition of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th
Cong. 2-5, 16-17 (1999) (statements of Senators DeWine, Kohl, Leahy, and Specter) [hereinafter Hearing].
Agreement between the Government of the United States and the Government of Japan
Concerning Cooperation on Anticompetitive Activities, Oct. 7, 1999, U.S.-Japan, http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/
public/intemational/docs/3740.htm [hereinafter Cooperation Agreement].
7 Id.
' 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1997).
9 Id. §§ 12-27.
1o These statutes are defined as the antitrust laws relevant to the Cooperation Agreement.
Cooperation Agreement, supra note 6, art. 1, at 2. The Federal Trade Commission Act ("FTCA") is also
specifically referenced in the Cooperation Agreement. Id. However, this Comment does not discuss the
FTCA because it does not generally apply to foreign entities. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(3). For a review of all
U.S. antitrust laws enforced against foreign firms, see U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE AND THE FED. TRADE
COMM'N, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS 2-11 (1995)
[hereinafter INT'L GUIDELINES].
" For an overview of U.S. antitrust laws, see generally 1 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION (rev.
ed., Aspen L. & Bus. 1997); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE (1994) (hereinafter FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY). As a general
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the Sherman Act, which governs contracts, combinations, and conspiracies;
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, which governs monopolies and
monopolization; and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, which governs mergers
and acquisitions that substantially lessen competition or tend to create a
monopoly.
A. Sherman Act
Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits every contract, combination,
or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce.' 2  Under Section 2,
persons 13 who monopolize, attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire
to monopolize are guilty of a felony. 14 The Department of Justice ("DOJ")
and private plaintiffs enforce the Sherman Act,' 5 and violations of the Act
may result in civil penalties, criminal penalties,'
6 and injunctive relief.' 7
proposition, U.S. antitrust laws are designed to protect competition between firms. See Standard Oil Co. v.
Fed. Trade Comm'n, 340 U.S. 231, 249 (1951) ("Congress was dealing with competition which it sought to
protect, and monopoly, which it sought to prevent." (quoting A.E. Statey Mfg. Co. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n,
135 F.2d 453, 455 (7th Cir. 1943))); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962) (stating
that "the legislative history [of the Sherman Act] illuminates Congressional concern with the protection of
competition, not competitors .....
12 15 U.S.C. § 1 provides:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. Every
person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared
to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by
fine not exceeding $10,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, $350,000, or by
imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the
court.
15 U.S.C. § 1.
13 Persons include corporations. 15 U.S.C. § 7.
14 15 U.S.C. § 2 provides:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any
person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be
punished by fine not exceeding $10,000,000 ifa corporation, or, if any other person, $350,000,
or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of
the court.
15 U.S.C. § 2.
'" Id. §§ 4, 15.
t6 Id. §§ 1,2.
17 15 U.S.C. § 4 provides:
The several district courts of the United States are invested with jurisdiction to prevent and
restrain violations of sections I to 7 of this title; and it shall be the duty of the several United
States attorneys in their respective districts, under the direction of the Attorney General, to
institute proceedings in equity to prevent and restrain such violations.
15 U.S.C. § 4.
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Private parties can seek treble damages.1 8 Both sections grant jurisdiction
over foreign firms.' 9
B. Clayton Act
The Clayton Act is the other central antitrust statute. Section 7 of the
Clayton Act prohibits mergers or corporate acquisitions that lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly.20 The DOJ, the Federal Trade
Commission ("FTC"), and private plaintiffs may bring actions under the
Clayton Act,21 and all three may seek injunctive relief.22  The Clayton Act
grants jurisdiction over foreign firms.23 Table 1 helps summarize the
important aspects of these statutes.
Table 1. Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and Section 7 of the
Clayton Act
Act Enforcement Prohibited Remedy Jurisdiction
Sherman Act DOJ, private Actual restraint of trade Civil, Criminal, Domestic /
§§ 1 & 2 plaintiffs, or monopolization. Injunctive. Foreign.
Clayton Act § 7 DOJ, FTC, Conduct "may" Civil, Domestic /
private substantially lessen Injunctive. Foreign.
plaintiffs, competition or tend to
create a monopoly.
In summary, the U.S. antitrust statutes "provide a system for control
and review by the courts of monopolization, of mergers (horizontal, vertical
and conglomerate), and of restraint of trade arising from agreement or
18 Id. § 15. Although the statute authorizing treble damages is technically within the Clayton Act,
the statute applies to the Sherman Act because the Clayton Act includes the Sherman Act in its definition of
"antitrust laws." Id. § 12.
'9 Id. §§ 1, 2. The Supreme Court held, "it is well established by now that the Sherman Act applies
to foreign conduct that was meant to produce and did in fact produce some substantial effect in the United
States." Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 (1993).20 15 U.S.C. § 18 provides:
No person engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce shall acquire, directly or
indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no person subject to the
jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of
another person engaged also in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce, where in any
line of commerce or in any activity affecting commerce in any section of the country, the effect
of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or tend to create a monopoly.
15 U.S.C. § 18.
2I Id. §§ 15, 15a.
22 Id. § 26.
23 See 15 U.S.C. § 12 (defining commerce as "trade or commerce among the several States and with
foreign nations...").
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combination., 24  The statutory provisions, however, merely represent the
starting point for understanding antitrust law. Antitrust statutes are not
conducive to interpretation by looking at their plain language because they
are often "vague and conclusory," and thus their "meaning must be
discerned from collateral sources. 25 Thus, federal courts have an important
role in defining the ambiguous statutory language 26 because the judicial
interpretation of these statutes changes with "ideology, politics and theory"
and "American economic and business policy."
27
C. Application of U.S. Antitrust Laws to Conduct Occurring Outside of
its Borders
The United States has been called the most aggressive antitrust
enforcer in the world.28  DOJ statistics support the proposition that the
United States aggressively enforces its antitrust laws internationally: since
1990, approximately twenty-five percent of the DOJ's 625 criminal cartel
29
antitrust cases were international in scope. 30  Between 1996 and 1999, the
DOJ and FTC challenged 271 mergers, 31 thirty-seven of which involved a
foreign firm. 32  In fact, the 1995 joint DOJ-FTC Antitrust Enforcement
Guidelines for International Operations, which provide businesses engaged
in international operations with antitrust guidance, identify international
antitrust enforcement (and cooperation) as a high priority for the DOJ and
FTC.33
Eight of the twenty-four antitrust actions brought between 1995 and
1999 by the United States under the Sherman Act that resulted in a fine over
24 ENFORCING ANTITRUST AGAINST FOREIGN ENTERPRISES 1 (Cornelis Canenbley ed., 1981)
[hereinafter ENFORCING ANTITRUST].
23 FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY, supra note 11, at 48-49.
26 Id. at 51-52.
27 Id. at 55.
28 Charles Brill & Brian Carlson, U.S. and Japanese Antimonopoly Policy and the Extraterritorial
Enforcement of Competition Laws, 33 INT'L LAW. 75, 76 (1999).
29 "A cartel is an agreement among firms who should be competitors to reduce their output to agreed
upon levels, or sell at an agreed upon price." FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY, supra note 11, at 140. Cartel
behavior includes price fixing; volume, customer, and market allocation; and bid rigging. FINAL REPORT,
supra note 1, at 163.
30 FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 167. In the context of this Comment, the term "international"
should be distinguished from the term "foreign." International antitrust enforcement encompasses the
conduct of firms, including U.S. firms, occurring outside U.S. territorial borders, whereas foreign
enforcement only encompasses the conduct of non-U.S. firms.
3' Id. at Annex 2-A.
32 Id. at Annex 2-B.
" INT'L GUIDELINES, supra note 10, at 1.
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$10 million were against Japanese firms. 34 In comparison, the United States
successfully prosecuted claims resulting in a $10 million fine against five
German firms, four Swiss firms, four U.S. firms, two Dutch firms, and one
Belgian firm.35 U.S. antitrust enforcement against Japanese firms continues
to cause tension between the United States and Japan because Japan feels
such enforcement infringes upon Japanese sovereignty.
III. UNILATERAL APPLICATION OF U.S. ANTITRUST LAWS AGAINST
JAPANESE FIRMS
International antitrust enforcement by the U.S. plus anticompetitive
conduct by Japanese firms cause tension- between the United States and
Japan. For example, the Subcommittee on Antitrust, Business Rights, and
Competition of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate
("Subcommittee") held a hearing on May 4, 1999, to address, in part,
problems with American business access to Japan's domestic market. At
the hearing, Senator DeWine, the Chairman of the Subcommittee, stated,
"[w]hile we seem to be making good progress [regarding cooperation] with
our colleagues in Europe, serious problems still remain in Japan., 37 The
Subcommittee and several U.S. businesses are concerned that
anticompetitive conduct by Japanese firms is keeping Japanese markets
closed to American business. The Japanese have challenged U.S. antitrust
actions against Japanese firms, arguing that application of U.S. domestic law
outside its borders infringes upon Japanese sovereignty.
A. U.S. Perception that Japan Keeps its Markets Closed to U.S. Firms
Several U.S. politicians and industries argue that Japan has failed to
open its markets to American firms. Barriers to U.S. entry in the Japanese
market were first addressed in 1989 through the Structural Impediment
Initiative ("SI") talks between the United States and Japan.38 Systems for
34 FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at Annex 4-A. The United States brought twenty-seven actions
overall resulting in fines over $10 million, but three of these actions were purely domestic. Id. The FINAL
REPORT did not include any actions that resulted in fines less than $10 million. Id. The Japanese firms
were Takeda Chemical Industries, Ltd., Eisai Co., Ltd., Showa Denko Carbon, Inc., Daiichi Pharmaceutical
Co., Ltd., Nippon Goshei, Fujisawa Pharmaceuticals Co., Ajinomoto Co., Inc., and Kyowa Hakko Kogyo,
Co., Ltd. Id.
35 Id. at Annex 4-A.
36 Hearing, supra note 5.
3 Id. at 2.
38 Mitsuo Matsushita, Essay, United States-Japan Trade Issues and a Possible Bilateral Antitrust
Agreement Between the United States and Japan, 16 ARIZ. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 249 (1999).
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distributing goods, exclusionary business practices, keiretsu relationships
(reciprocal dealings between Japanese enterprises), and pricing mechanisms
were among the market barriers that Japan agreed to address as a result of
the SII talks. 39  Nonetheless, continued complaints about market access
caused the Subcommittee to hold a hearing on international antitrust
cooperation and enforcement, positive comity agreements, the flat glass
industry, and "problems with the Japanese market" in May 1999.40 Senator
Kohl stated at the 1999 Subcommittee hearing that "after decades of trying
to open the Japanese markets to paper, flat glass, and rice, and after we have
signed several bilateral treaties to do just this, American companies are still
frozen out of the Japanese market. '4 1 At the hearing, three officers of U.S.
corporations testified about the difficulty they faced entering Japanese flat
glass and paper markets.42 This testimony reflects the frustrations of U.S.
corporations. Mr. Evans, the president and CEO of Consolidated Papers,
testified, "Japan is a protectionist society, but I know it is a cultural thing, so
I am frustrated. I know we cannot go in there and police their culture. We
cannot impose what we would like to see on them. '43 Mr. Walters, Group
Vice President of Guardian Industries Corporation testified in regard to the
flat glass market that "the Japanese do not seem to take a U.S. point of view
seriously if there is not some form of threat or retaliation or leverage on our




The International Competition Policy Advisory Committee
("ICPAC")45 specifically addressed these allegations in its Final Report
31 Mitsuo Matusushita, The Structural Impediments Initiative, 12 U. MICH. J. INT'L L. 436, 440-44.
For further discussion of the SII talks, see infra Part IV.C.
4o Hearing, supra note 5.
4' Id. at 3. One claim is that "de facto" trade barriers deny firms access to the Japanese market.
Mitsuo Matsushita, Special Issue from the Conference on Legal Framework of US.-Japan Economic
Relation, The Legal Framework of Trade and Investment in Japan, 27 HARV. INT'L LJ. 361, 372 (1986).
One example of a de facto barrier is the claim that the Japanese distribution system is so "complex and
exclusive that it has been a trade barrier to foreign enterprises." Id. Another claim is that there are closed
business groups in Japan that exclude foreign enterprises, thereby creating trade barriers. Id. at 373.
42 The testimony included that of Peter S. Walters, Group Vice President of Guardian Industries
Corporation, regarding the flat glass market; Gorton M. Evans, President and CEO of Consolidated Papers,
regarding the paper market; and John C. Reichenback, Director of Government Affairs for PPG Industries,
Inc., regarding the flat glass market. Hearing, supra note 5, at 25-46 (statements of Peter S. Walters, Group
Vice President, Guardian Industries Corporation, Gorton M. Evans, President and Chief Executive Officer,
Consolidated Papers, and John C. Reichenback, Director of Government Affairs, PPG Industries
Incorporated).
4 Id. at 52 (statement of Gorton M. Evans, President and Chief Executive Officer, Consolidated
Papers).
44 Id. at 53 (statement of Peter S. Walters, Group Vice President, Guardian Industries Corporation).
41 CHARTER: INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS ADVISORY COMMITrEE (Oct. 3, 1997),
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/icpac/icpac l.htm. Attorney General Janet Reno chartered the ICPAC on October
3, 1997 to address broad international competition issues. Id. Specifically, the ICPAC was charged with
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issued on February 28, 2000.46 The ICPAC reported complaints by U.S.
businesses that their entry or expansion into Japanese markets was hindered
by the business practices of Japanese competitors, sometimes with the
support of the government.47  Further, U.S. companies have complained
about access to the Japanese auto industry, flat glass market, paper industry,
film market, electronic equipment market, and soda ash industry.48  The
ICPAC report concluded that there was no single policy tool capable of
addressing the problems raised by U.S. firms. 49  Instead, the ICPAC
suggested three different tools to counter anticompetitive conduct by foreign
firms: bilateral agreements with positive comity provisions, unilateral
extraterritorial enforcement of U.S. antitrust laws, and development of
international competition policy initiatives.50  Rather than embrace
cooperation and positive comity, however, Senator DeWine, the
Subcommittee Chairman, argued that the DOJ should "strongly consider the
extraterritorial enforcement of our antitrust laws in order to prevent Japanese
companies from violating the rights of American companies.' Senator
DeWine appears to base his distrust of a positive comity agreement on his
belief that Japan has failed to honor past trade agreements. 2
making recommendations regarding how the United States can best work with foreign nations to deter
anticompetitive international cartels, coordinate efforts with foreign nations to review multinational
mergers, and protect the United States' economy from international antitrust violations. Id. The ICPAC
made its final report to the Attorney General and Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust on February 28,
2000. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1.
46 See generally FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, ch. 5.
41 Id. at 211.
41 Id. at 211-15.
41 Id. at 226.
" Id. Positive comity is a central topic in this Comment and is discussed infra Part V.A. Unilateral
extraterritorial antitrust enforcement is discussed supra Part II1.B. Regarding the development of
international competition policy initiatives, the ICPAC found that bilateral agreements with positive comity
provisions are "unlikely to be a sufficient response to all of the competition problems and the opportunities
presented by the global economy." FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 255. In particular, the ICPAC
recommends developing comprehensive competition policy under the auspices of the Organization for
Economic Development ("OECD") and the World Trade Organization ("WTO"). Id. Analysis of such
initiatives is outside the scope of this comment, but may warrant future research.
51 Hearing, supra note 5, at 3 (statement of Senator DeWine).
52 Id. at 2 (statement of Senator DeWine). Senator DeWine does not specify what trade agreements
Japan failed to honor. Id.
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B. The Matsushita and Nippon Paper Cases: U.S. Antitrust Laws Apply
to Conduct by Japanese Firms that Occurs Outside U.S. Territorial
Boundaries
The unilateral application of U.S. antitrust laws to the conduct of
Japanese firms may infringe upon Japanese sovereignty. According to the
principle of state sovereignty, "each state is the sole arbiter of the legal
nature of acts performed within its territory. Only the public authorities of
that State have the right to act within the territory. Thus an act of public
authority of State A performed within the territory of State B, is an
infringement of the Sovereignty of State B, unless previously consented to
by the government or other designated authority of State B."53 Even so, U.S.
courts have put aside Japanese sovereignty 54 concerns in two major cases: In
re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation ("Matsushita")55 and
United States v. Nippon Paper Co.
56
1. The Matsushita case
In Matsushita, two U.S. firms, National Union Electric Corporation
and Zenith Radio Corporation, filed antitrust claims against seven Japanese
television manufacturers57 under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.
58
The plaintiffs alleged a conspiracy by Japanese television manufacturers to
drive American television manufacturers out of business by a scheme to
raise, fix, and maintain artificially high prices for televisions sold by the
defendants in Japan while simultaneously maintaining artificially low prices
for televisions exported to and sold in the United States.59  Zenith also
alleged that two of the seven Japanese companies violated Section 7 of the
" ENFORCING ANTITRUST, supra note 24, at 12.
54 Id. Implications of sovereignty have historically elicited the most objections from foreign
governments to the application of U.S. antitrust laws to foreign firms. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, Annex
1-Ci.
55 In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation, 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), rev d sub
nom. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) [hereinafter Antitrust
Litigation]. National Union Electric Corporation ("NUE") filed its complaint in 1970 and Zenith filed its
complaint in 1974. Id. at 250. The cases were consolidated in 1975. In re Japanese Electronic Products
Antitrust Litigation, 388 F.Supp. 565, 567 (1975).
56 United States v. Nippon Paper Co., Ltd. 109 F.3d I (lstCir. 1997).
57 Antitrust Litigation, supra note 55, at 251. The principal defendants were Mitsubishi Corp.,
Matsushita Electrical Industrial Co. Ltd., Toshiba Corp., Hitachi, Ltd., Sharp Corp., Sanyo Electric Co.,
Ltd. Sony Corp., and Mitsubishi Electric Corp. Id.
5s Id. at 251. The plaintiffs also alleged violations of section 73 of the Wilson Tariff Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 8 and of the Antidumping Act of 1916, 15 U.S.C. § 72. Id. Zenith alleged violations of section 2(a) of
the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. §18. Id.
59 Id.
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Clayton Act by acquiring interests in American companies. 60  The plaintiffs
sought treble damages and injunctive relief.61  The district court granted
summary judgment in favor of the defendant corporations.62
On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed the lower court in favor of the
plaintiffs on the majority of the claims.63  One ground for reversal was the
Third Circuit's rejection of the defendant's sovereign compulsion defense.64
Under the sovereign compulsion defense, "American courts will refuse to
base liability on the acts of private individuals or firms that were compelled
by a foreign sovereign to be performed in that sovereign's territory. The
courts have construed the doctrine rather strictly. If conduct is merely
authorized, not compelled, the defense cannot be raised; nor can it if the
foreign sovereign compels extraterritorial acts. 65 The defendants argued
that they were entitled to summary judgment because the "activities of those
defendants in Japan were undertaken at the direction of the Japanese
government, as an integral part of its trade policy toward the United
States. 66 In particular, the defendants argued that the Japanese Ministry of
International Trade and Industry ("MITI") mandated agreements between
Japanese firms fixing minimum prices for exports. 67  The Third Circuit
rejected these arguments. 68
60 id.
61 Id.
62 Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 513 F. Supp. 1100 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
63 Antitrust Litigation, supra note 55, at 319.
64 Id. at 315.
6' FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY, supra note 11, at 706.
66 Antitrust Litigation, supra note 55, at 315.
67 Id. at 315. See also James Wilson Perkins, In Re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust
Litigation: Sovereign Compulsion, Act of State, and the Extraterritorial Reach of the United States
Antitrust Laws, 36 AM. U. L. REv. 721, 751-52 (1987). In the Matsushita litigation, supra note 55, MITI
sent a letter to the U.S. Department of State explaining that MITI "directed" Japanese television
manufacturers to fix the export price and that the firms had no choice but to follow MITI's direction. See
Statement from Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry to the United States (Apr. 25, 1975),
reprinted in Mitsuo Matsushita & Lawrence Repeta, Restricting the Supply ofJapanese Automobiles:
Sovereign Compulsion ofSovereign Collusion?, 14 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 47, 74-79 (1982). See also
Matsushita, supra note 41, at 378. In 1981, Yoshio Ikawara, the Japanese Ambassador, sent a letter to the
U.S. Attorney General outlining how MITI was going to restrict Japanese automobile exports to the United
States in order to help the U.S. automobile industry recover. See Letter from Japanese Ambassador
Okawara to U.S. Attorney General William French Smith (May 7, 1981), reprinted in Matsushita &
Repeta, supra, at 78-79. In response to the letter, which stated that MITI would direct the number of
Japanese automobile exports, Attorney General Smith stated that the export restraints would not give rise to
liability under U.S. antitrust laws. See Letter from United States Attorney General Smith to Japanese
Ambassador Okawara (May 7, 1981), reprinted in Michael William Lochmann, The Japanese Voluntary
Restraint on Automobile Exports: An Abandonment ofthe Free Trade Principles ofthe GA TT and the Free
Market Principles of United States Antitrust Laws, 27 HARV. INT'L L.J. 99, 157 (1986). See also
Lochmann, supra, at 105-07.
68 Antitrust Litigation, supra note 55, at 315. The court reasoned that there was not sufficient
evidence that MITI determined the pricing arrangement and that there was ample evidence suggesting that
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Following the Third Circuit's summary judgment reversal, the
defendants appealed to the United States Supreme Court.69  The amicus
curiae brief in support of certiorari submitted by the government of Japan
focused on the sovereign compulsion defense and outlined how Japan
compelled the conduct of the Japanese firms. 70 The brief also explained the
potential adverse impact on the U.S.-Japan trade relationship if the Court
rejected the sovereign compulsion defense.71 Likewise, one commentator
criticized the Third Circuit's rejection of the sovereign compulsion defense
because it "disregarded express Japanese government requirements and the
strong political overtones in Matsushita. Ultimately, the conclusion that an
exercise of jurisdiction under these circumstances was viable may adversely
affect U.S.-Japanese trade relations., 72  The Supreme Court reversed and
remanded the case without decidinf the sovereign compulsion defense
argued by the petitioner-defendants. 3 Thus, since the Supreme Court's
decision did not answer the sovereign compulsion question, the Third
Circuit's rejection of Japan's sovereign compulsion defense remained intact.
2. The Nippon Paper Case
Following a criminal investigation that began in 1992, a federal grand
jury indicted Nippon Paper Industries Co. ("NPI"), a Japanese manufacturer
of facsimile paper, for violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.74 The
indictment alleged that NPI and unnamed co-conspirators held meetings in
Japan to fix the price of thermal fax paper in North America.75 Again, the
even if MITI did mandate pricing, the defendants departed from the MITI-approved pricing and took steps
to conceal that departure. Id. The court also argued the activity violated Japanese law. Id.69 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
70 Brief of Amicus Curiae in Support of the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Government of Japan,Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1984). The govemment of Japan
opened its brief by stating, "In order to assure that Japanese exporting activity is carried on in as orderly a
manner as possible, the Japanese government has from time to time required Japanese nationals to enter
into agreements and observe regulations restricting exports from Japan to the United States and elsewhere."
Id. The government went on to say that holding the defendants liable would "penalize these Japanese
defendants for the sovereign acts of their government and would adversely affect the smooth
implementation of Japan's trade policy." Id. The government argues "business conducted by Japanese
nationals pursued within Japanese territory relating to Japanese exports and required by the Japanese
Government can neither constitute nor be considered by American courts and juries as a 'feature' of an
alleged unlawful antitrust conspiracy." Id.
71 Id. The brief concludes with a caveat: "... the decision of the Court of Appeals raises most
serious questions and may directly affect the future economic and trade relations between our countries."
Id.
72 Perkins, supra note 67, at 771.
73 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. at 8.
74 Nippon Paper, supra note 56, at 2.
75 id.
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Japanese firms raised the foreign sovereign compulsion defense arguing that
the MITI mandated their conduct.76  The district court dismissed the
indictment, holding that a criminal antitrust prosecution could not be based
on conduct that occurred entirely outside the United States.77 The DOJ
appealed the district court decision to the First Circuit Court of Appeals and
the government of Japan submitted a brief of amicus curiae.
Japan's amicus brief to the First Circuit emphasized principles of
international law and the potential transgressions into areas of national
78
sovereignty. Nippon Paper was more controversial than Matsushita
because the case sought to impose criminal penalties on Japanese firms.
7 9
Japan argued to the First Circuit:
In light of the basic principles of international law, business
activities conducted by Japanese enterprises within the territory
of Japan fall primarily under the scope of Japanese legislation,
and should not be regulated by extraterritorial application of
United States law. Any such extraterritorial exercise of public
authority may infringe the sovereign rights of other countries
and must therefore be strictly limited. The attempt to impose
foreign economic regulation of private operators through
criminal sanctions is of course particularly problematic.
80
The First Circuit reinstated the indictment after finding that Section 1
of the Sherman Act "applies to wholly foreign conduct which has an
intended and substantial effect in the United States.' In its brief to the
Supreme Court supporting certiorari, the government of Japan argued the
First Circuit's application of the Sherman Act was inconsistent with82international law and would profoundly infringe upon Japan's sovereignty.
In addition, the Japanese government suggested in its briefs to both the First
Circuit and the Supreme Court that cooperation was a more attractive
76 Id. See also supra note 67 (discussion of the MITI letters).
77 Nippon Paper, supra note 56, at 2.
78 Martha Emma Rice, United States v. Nippon Paper: Historical Trends and Modern Implications
of Isolation, Cartels, and Price Fixing, 29 U. TOL. L. REV. 613, 632 (1998).
79 Criminal sanctions under Section 1 of the Sherman Act include a $350,000 fine and imprisonment
for three years for persons, and a $10 million fine for corporations. See supra notes 12 and 14.
80 Brief of Amicus Curiae of the Government of Japan, United States v. Nippon Paper Co., Ltd, 109
F.3d 1, 7-8 (1st Cir. 1997) [hereinafter Brief of Amicus Curiae].
81 Nippon Paper, supra note 56, at 9.
82 Mark A. A. Warner, Restrictive Trade Practices and the Extraterritorial Application of U.S.
Antitrust and Trade Legislation, 19 Nw. J. INT'L. & Bus. 330, 335 (1999).
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alternative to unilateral antitrust enforcement by the United States. 8' The
Supreme Court did not grant certiorari.
84
In short, U.S. courts have put aside Japanese sovereignty concerns,
allowing the unilateral application of U.S. antitrust laws to conduct by
Japanese firms that occurs outside of the United States.
IV. FORMAL EFFORTS BY THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN TO COOPERATE
IN INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
Japan's amicus brief to the First Circuit in Nippon Paper argued that
jurisdictional conflicts should be settled with cooperation and coordination,
and through a bilateral agreement, rather than unilateral extraterritorial
application of national antitrust laws. 85  In fact, the governments of the
United States and Japan began investigations into the Nippon Paper
situation cooperatively. 86 At the DOJ's request in an investigation related to
Nippon Paper, the Japanese Prosecutor's Office raided and seized
documents from two Japanese companies in 1994.87 The Japanese
Prosecutor's Office also secured the cooperation of other Japanese thermal
fax paper companies to produce documents and questioned representatives
of Japanese thermal fax paper manufacturers in the presence of U.S.
officials. 88 These efforts resulted in guilty pleas from three U.S. companies,
four Japanese companies, and one Japanese national. 89 The United States
and Japan have made several attempts at cooperation through traditional
international law mechanisms, mutual legal assistance treaties, and bilateral
discussions.
A. Traditional International Law Mechanisms
Traditional international law mechanisms provide one avenue for
cooperation. These traditional mechanisms include the use of diplomatic
channels and court-to-court letter rogatory requests.9° The thermal fax paperinvestigation, where the Japanese Prosecutor's Office acted at the request of
83 id.
84 Nippon Paper Industries Co., Ltd. v. United States, 522 U.S. 1044, reh'g denied, 522 U.S. 1124
(1998).
85 BriefofAmicus Curiae, supra note 80.
86 Id. at 4.
87 Id. See also Warner, supra note 82,'at 335; FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 183.
88 Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 80, at 4; see also FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 183.
89 Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 80, at 4.
90 FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 181-82. Letters rogatory are interjurisidictional court-to-court
requests for assistance in both civil and criminal matters. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1781, 1782 (1999).
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the United States, is one example of cooperation through traditional
mechanisms. 9' The DOJ used diplomatic channels in that investigation to
request assistance from the Japanese government. 92  Comity is another
traditional international law mechanism that may lead to cooperation. The
principle of comity means "nations are under a moral duty to cooperate with
each other in enforcing their respective laws, and to resolve international
conflicts fairly with a sensitivity to each other's interests." 93 The application
of comity in antitrust cases against foreign firms is an unsettled area of
law.
94
B. Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties
The United States and Japan have also entered into a Mutual Legal
Assistance Treaties ("MLATs"). MLATs are cooperative agreements that
offer a formal mechanism to provide assistance in criminal matters,
including compelling production of materials and obtaining confidential
information from foreign competition authorities. 9 6  MLATs, however,
address criminal matters generally; they are not specific to antitrust
investigations. 97  There is very little disclosed about investigations under
MLATs. In fact, there are only three instances where the details of MLAT
assistance have been disclosed, and all three involve Canada.98
9' FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 183.
92 Id.
93 ENFORCING ANTITRUST, supra note 24, at 13 ("Such is the request made by the United States
Federal Court. It is our duty and our pleasure to do all we can to assist that court, just as we would expect
the United States court to help us in like circumstances. Do unto others as you would be done by.")
(quoting Lord Denning in the Westinghouse case, regarding a letters rogatory request).
9' Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 (1993). The Supreme Court held, "it
is well established by now that the Sherman Act applies to foreign conduct that was meant to produce and
did in fact produce some substantial effect in the United States." Id. at 796. The Court went on to say that
the principle of comity, even if applied, did not preclude jurisdiction over the foreign defendants. Id. at
770. The Nippon Paper decision supports this position. See Nippon Paper, supra note 56, at 9. See also
FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, Annex I-Cii.
95 Stephen J. Squeri, Government Investigation and Enforcement: Antitrust Division and the Federal
Trade Commission, 1181 PLI/CoRP. 873, 942 (2000).
96 FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 181.
9' Id. Annex l-Cix.
9 Id. at 182. The U.S. government discloses very few details about criminal investigations due to
their sensitive nature. Id.
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C. Bilateral Discussions
1. General Initiatives
The United States and Japan have engaged in bilateral discussions
regarding international antitrust enforcement. These discussions first
occurred within the context of the Structural Impediments Initiative ("SII")
between 1989 and 1992.99 The SII talks addressed market access issues, °°
and led to an increase in the Japan Fair Trade Commission ("JFTC")101
budget and staff, increased penalties for anti-competitive conduct, increased
enforcement against violators, reinstatement of criminal enforcement, and
procedural changes to reduce obstacles to private actions against antitrust
violators. 10 2  The Clinton administration also engaged in talks with Japan
about competition policy through the Enhanced Initiative on Deregulation
and Competition Policy ("Enhanced Initiative").10 3 The Enhanced Initiative
has also led to an increase in budget and personnel for the JFTC.' °4
Additionally, the JFTC also agreed to reaffirm its commitment to effectively
enforce Japanese antitrust laws, to survey compliance with antitrust laws,
and to submit legislation to abolish exemptions from antitrust laws for
certain types of cartels.'0 5
2. Industry-Specific Initiatives
The United States and Japan have also engaged in bilateral
discussions regarding the paper and flat glass markets that have resulted in
cooperation agreements. 106  Following a year of negotiations, the United
States and Japan entered into a five-year agreement to substantially increase
U.S. access to the Japanese paper market.'0 7 However, Gorton M. Evans, a
representative of the U.S. paper industry, argues that the agreement is
99 Id. at 216. See also Aubry D. Smith, Note, Bringing Down Private Trade Barriers-An
Assessment of the United States' Unilateral Options: Section 301 of the 1974 Trace Act and
Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Antitrust Law, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 241, 265-66 (1994).
oo See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
01 The Japan Fair Trade Commission is the competition authority in Japan analogous to the DOJ and
FTC in the United States. Cooperation Agreement, supra note 6, art. I, §§ 1, 2.
102 FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 216.
103 Id.
'04 FIRST JOINT STATUS REPORT ON THE U.S.-JAPAN ENHANCED INITIATIVE ON DEREGULATION AND
COMPETITION POLICY 11 (May 15, 1998), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/intemational/docs/
1792.htm.
' Id. at 11-12.
:06 Hearing, supra note 5, at 29, 37.
l0' Id. at 29.
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ineffective. He noted that in 1998, U.S. paper exports accounted for 1.7% of
the Japanese paper market.108 This was roughly the same percentage of the
Japanese paper market occupied by U.S. paper exports prior to the
agreement. 1°9 Mr. Evans concluded, "[o]ur experience with the 1992 U.S.-
Japan Paper Market Access Agreement and the Japanese Government's
unwillingness even to discuss its renewal illustrates the limitations of trade
negotiations as a tool to open Japanese markets to competition." 1 0
The 1995 U.S.-Japan flat glass agreement has likewise been
ineffective in the eyes of U.S. flat glass producers."' John C. Reichenback,
Director of Government Affairs for PPG Industries Inc., stated that "[t]he
U.S.-Japan Flat Glass Agreement held out hope for change, but after nearly
five years of its operation, it has not lived up to its initial promise. Today,
the Japanese flat glass market remains largely unchanged."' 12  Although
Japan claimed the agreement was effective in enhancing foreign access to
Japanese markets, some believe the evidence is far from conclusive." 
3
3.. Skepticism Surrounding Bilateral Agreements
Based on these observations by U.S. corporations, those present at the
1999 Subcommittee hearing were skeptical about a U.S.-Japan Cooperation
Agreement. In his opening remarks to the Subcommittee hearing, Senator
DeWine, Chairman of the Subcommittee, commented on the proposed
Cooperation Agreement. He said, "I believe positive comity agreements are
generally a good thing. Based on our experience, it seems that they help to
diffuse some of the tensions that sometimes arise in the course of antitrust
investigations involving companies from different countries.'" 114 However,
he felt that the United States should be cautious about entering into such an
agreement with Japan because of his belief that Japan failed to honor
previous agreements and the "interests of American companies."''
15
Alternatively, he suggested "extraterritorial enforcement of our antitrust
'o' Id. at 28.
109 Id.
o Id. at 31.
I.. Id. at 37.
112 id.
113 See Theodore R. Posner, Addressing Private and Public/Private Market Access Barriers, 31 LAW
& POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1003, 1008 (2000). Posner cites Japan's economic recession and the close affiliation
with some American glass producers with Japanese firms as possible reasons why more U.S. glass was
imported to Japan at lower prices. Id.
114 Hearing, supra note 5, at 2.
15 Id. The Subcommittee did not provide any examples of previous agreements that Japan had failed
to honor. Id.
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laws in order to prevent Japanese companies from violating the rights of
American companies."16
V. THE U.S.-JAPAN ANTITRUST COOPERATION AGREEMENT
On October 7, 1999, Attorney General Janet Reno and the heads of
American and Japanese competition authorities signed the antitrust
cooperation agreement "to strengthen their cooperation in the antitrust
area."" 7  The Cooperation Agreement is a bilateral Executive Agreement
between the United States and Japan. 118  However, it does not override
inconsistent provisions of U.S. law because it is not a treaty ratified by the
United States Senate.1 9 The purpose of the Cooperation Agreement is "to
contribute to the effective enforcement of the competition laws of each
country through the development of cooperative relationships between the
competition authorities of [the United States and Japan].' 120 Attorney
General Reno lauded the Cooperation Agreement as an "important
milestone."' 121 Joel I. Klein, Assistant Attorney General in charge of the
Antitrust Division, called the agreement a "significant step that will benefit
antitrust enforcement in both countries" that will "promote a new level of
cooperation between the United States and Japan in investigating practices
that harm competition in our markets."' 12 2 The Cooperation Agreement is an
important milestone because it addresses U.S. market access and Japanese
sovereignty concerns through its positive comity provision.
A. The Cooperation Agreement Positive Comity Provision
Article V of the Cooperation Agreement is the positive comity
provision. 123  Positive comity is one of the "more significant recent
116 Id. at3.
17 Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, United States and Japan Sign Antitrust Cooperation
Agreement (Oct. 7, 1999), http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/pressreleases/1999/3739.htm.
11b FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, Annex 1-Cv-vii. An Executive Agreement is entered into by the
Executive Branch of the U.S. government, of which the DOJ is part, and a foreign government. Id.
119 Id. Annex 1-Cv.
120 Cooperation Agreement, supra note 6, art. I, § 1.
121 U.S. Department of Justice, supra note 117.
122 Id.
123 Cooperation Agreement, supra note 6, art. V. Article V reads as follows:
1. If the competition authority of a Party believes that anticompetitive activities carried out in the
territory of the other country adversely affect the important interests of the former Party, such
competition authority, taking into account the importance of avoiding conflicts regarding
jurisdiction and taking into account that the competition authority of the other Party may be in a
position to conduct more effective enforcement activities with regard to such anticompetitive
MARCH 2001
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
developments" in bilateral antitrust cooperation agreements. 124  Positive
comity attempts to avoid jurisdictional and sovereignty tensions "by placing
initial responsibility for investigation of market access barriers into the
hands of the jurisdiction where the alleged anticompetitive conduct
occurs."
' 12 5 Put another way, positive comity is a "mechanism whereby the
jurisdiction most closely associated with the alleged anticompetitive conduct
assumes primary responsibility for the investigation and possible
remedy." 1 26  It is important to note that while positive comity describes a
form of voluntary cooperation in competition law enforcement, it is "not a
general term for cooperation that involves 'positive' (affirmative) steps by
the requested country or has 'positive' (beneficial) results.' 2 7
Generally, a positive comity request results in an initial investigation
by the requested party, and the requested competition authority reports back
to the referring competition authority. 128 The referring competition authority
can accept these results, try to persuade the other competition authority to
modify its findings, or initiate an antitrust action under its own laws. 129
Positive comity fosters cooperation by avoiding potential jurisdictional and
sovereignty issues. 13  Sovereignty is not implicated because positive comity
activities, may request that the competition authority of the other Party initiate appropriate
enforcement activities. The request shall be as specific as possible about the nature of the
anticompetitive activities and their effect on the important interests of the Party of the requesting
competition authority, and shall include an offer of such further information and other
cooperation as the requesting competition authority is able to provide.
2. The requested competition authority shall carefully consider whether to initiate enforcement
activities, or whether to expand ongoing enforcement activities, with respect to the
anticompetitive activities identified in the request. The requested competition authority shall
inform the requesting competition authority of its decision as soon as practically possible. If
enforcement activities are initiated, the requested competition authority shall inform the
requesting competition authority of their outcome and, to the extent possible, of significant
interim developments.
Id.
124 FINAL REPORT, supra note I, Annex I -Cvi.
'25 Id. at 227.
126 Id. The FINAL REPORT continues: "Specifically, when anticompetitive conduct that adversely
affects the important interests of one party occurs within the borders of another party, the 'affected party'
may re uest that the 'territorial party' initiate appropriate enforcement action." Id.
12, COMM. ON COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY, ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. AND DEV., CLP REPORT ON
POSITIVE COMITY 17 (1999) [hereinafter CLP Report].
128 A. Douglas Melamed, An Important First Step: A U.S./Japan Bilateral Antitrust Cooperation
Agreement, Speech to the Japan Fair Trade Institute (1998), at 9, http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/
2092.htm.
129 Id. at 10.
130 FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 227.
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presents the opportunity to obviate the need for extraterritorial
enforcement.'31
Figure 1 illustrates how positive comity under the cooperation
agreement would work if the United States initiated the positive comity
request.







" Is it important to avoid
jurisdictional conflict?
* Is Japan in a position to
more effectively enforce
antitrust laws?
If the answer to all three
questions is yes, then the
United States makes a
positive comity request.
" The request will be
specific about the nature
of the anticompetitive
activities and how they
affect the United States.
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B. Positive Comity as a Means to Address U.S. and Japanese Antitrust
Enforcement Concerns
1. The Strength of Positive Comity
The Cooperation Agreement's positive comity provision has several
potential benefits. The main strength of the positive comity provision is that
it addresses Japanese sovereignty concerns and U.S. market access concerns.
Positive comity provides for improved effectiveness in antitrust enforcement
because it is designed to avoid jurisdictional conflicts.' 32 If the United
States makes a positive comity request and Japan takes action under its own
laws, the jurisdictional conflict that leads to the implication of Japanese
sovereignty is avoided. Likewise, if the United States feels that Japanese
markets are closed to U.S. businesses, a request by the United States under
the positive comity provision would require Japan to investigate and
potentially end the conduct keeping the Japanese market closed.
2. Weaknesses of Positive Comity
The positive comity provision has several weaknesses that all seem to
fall within the same category: it does not strictly proscribe unilateral antitrust
enforcement actions against foreign firms.
The first weakness of positive comity is that it is constrained by the
antitrust laws of each country.1 33 Specifically, in order for enforcement to
follow a positive comity request, the conduct in question must be illegal in
the country from which cooperation is requested. 34 For example, conduct
that the United States asks Japan to act upon may be exempted from Japan's
antitrust laws.' 35 Whether or not differences in U.S. and Japanese antitrust
laws will cause a significant obstacle is still unclear, however. While some
commentators argue that U.S. and Japanese antitrust laws differ in their
application,136 others believe that both the United States and Japan file
similar complaints with enforcement authorities.
37
132 CLP Report, supra note 127, at 22.
'31 Id. at 23.
134 Id.
3 Matsushita, supra note 38, at 253. One example of conduct that is exempted from Japanese
antitrust law is the export cartel. Id.
136 See, e.g., Brill & Carlson, supra note 28.
137 Harry First, Antitrust Enforcement in Japan, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 137, 138 (1995).
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Second, the positive comity provision is voluntary.' 38 Neither Japan
nor the United States can be compelled to engage in positive comity, even if
positive comity would result in the "best or only remedy.' ' 139 Under Article
V of the Cooperation Agreement, the country that receives the request to
initiate antitrust enforcement actions decides whether or not it will, in fact,
initiate an enforcement action. 140 There is no language in Article V stating
that after a positive comity request, the requesting country cannot initiate an
antitrust action.' 4' In fact, Article XI provides that "[n]othing in this
Agreement shall be construed to prejudice the policy or legal position of
either Party regarding any issue related to jurisdiction."'' 4 2 Therefore, it
remains easy for the United States to engage in a unilateral antitrust action
against a Japanese firm. 1
43
Third, positive comity is a relatively unproven method that requires
experience, confidence, and trust between countries in order to operate
effectively.' 44 While the positive comity concept has been around for a
significant amount of time, 45 it has only recently come into relatively
frequent use.' 46 For example, as of February 2000, there had been only one
formal positive comity request from the United States to the European
Community (EC).147  Although the EC indicated that it kept the DOJ
informed of its investigation, the EC still has not taken any final action
under the positive comity provision.148
Fourth, the Cooperation Agreement itself is susceptible to dissolution
by the parties or to contradictory laws. Article XIII of the Cooperation
Agreement provides that "[e]ither Party may terminate this Agreement by
giving two months written notice to the other Party through diplomatic
channels."' 149 Another related flaw is that the Cooperation Agreement is not
138 CLP Report, supra note 127, at 23.
139 Id.
140 Cooperation Agreement, supra note 6, art. V.2.
141 See generally Cooperation Agreement, supra note 6, art. V.
142 Id. art. XI.4.
143 Under the agreement, however, one country should notify the other country in the event of a
unilateral antitrust action that affects the important interests of the other country. Cooperation Agreement,
supra note 6, art. I1.1.
144 CLP Report, supra note 127, at 23.
145 The roots of positive comity principle can be traced to the 1954 Friendship, Commerce, and
Navigation Treaty between Germany and the United States. FtNAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 227.
146 See id. Positive comity was first included in the 1991 U.S.-European Community Agreement. Id.
at 229.
147 Id. Annex l-Cvi.
"' Id. at 233. The EC did issue a "Statement of Objections" indicating the EC "maintained regular
contact" with the DOJ. Id. at 234. However, the Statement of Objections "does not represent any final
determination on the part of the Commission." Id.
149 Cooperation Agreement, supra note 6, art. XII.2.
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a formal treaty ratified by the U.S. Senate.150  This means that the
Cooperation Agreement does not supersede any contradictory law and is
susceptible to being overridden by new laws.' 5' The language in the
Cooperation Agreement itself indicates that the provisions will be carried
out only to the extent consistent with the laws of each country.' 52 Despite
these shortcomings, positive comity can still be an effective tool to solve
antitrust and sovereignty-related issues.
53
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS TO STRENGTHEN THE U.S.-JAPAN ANTITRUST
COOPERATION AGREEMENT
The United States and Japan should strengthen the positive comity
provision to better address its weaknesses. The Final Report of the
International Policy Advisory Committee ("ICPAC")' 54 suggests ways in
which positive comity provisions can be strengthened.155 The ICPAC report
included two relevant recommendations for improving positive comity in
bilateral agreements: integrating parts of the U.S.-EC 1998 Positive Comity
supplement and applying the positive comity experience of the Sabre
corporation. 1
56
A. The U.S.-EC Positive Comity Agreement as a Model
The U.S.-EC positive comity agreement 57 is a useful model with
which to address some weaknesses in the U.S.-Japan Cooperation
Agreement. The United States and the European Commission supplemented
their antitrust cooperation agreement on June 4, 1998 with provisions that
reaffirmed and enhanced the commitment of both countries to the principle
of positive comity.15 8 Under Article IV, entitled, "Deferral or Suspension of
150 See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
151 Id.
152 Cooperation Agreement, supra note 6, art. 1. 1, XI. 1.
13 FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 239.
154 See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
155 FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 239.
156 The other recommendations are increasing communication and transparency in the positive comity
process and encouraging competition authorities to endorse positive comity in their mission statements. Id.
at 277.
157 Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the European
Communities on the Application of Positive Comity Principles in the Enforcement of Their Competition
Laws (June 4, 1998) [hereinafter EC Positive Comity Agreement], http://usdoj.gov/atr/public/
intemational/docs/1781 .htm.
'58 FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 230. The basic comity provision reads:
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Investigations in Reliance on Enforcement Activity by the Requested
Party," 159 the parties may agree that the party making a positive comity
The competition authorities of a Requesting Party may request the competition authorities of a
Requested Party to investigate and, if warranted, to remedy anticompetitive activities in
accordance with the Requested Party's competition laws. Such a request may be made
regardless of whether the activities also violate the Requesting Party's competition laws, and
regardless of whether the competition authorities of the Requesting Party have commenced or
contemplate taking enforcement activities under their own competition laws.
EC Positive Comity Agreement, supra note 157, arts. III, IV.
159 EC Positive Comity Agreement, supra note 157, art. IV. Article IV in its entirety reads:
1. The competition authorities of the Parties may agree that the competition authorities of the
Requesting Party will defer or suspend pending or contemplated enforcement activities during
the pendency of enforcement activities of the Requested Party.
2. The competition authorities of a Requesting Party will normally defer or suspend their own
enforcement activities in favor of enforcement activities by the competition authorities of the
Requested Party when the following conditions are satisfied:
(a) The anticompetitive activities at issue:
(i) do not have a direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable impact on consumers in the
Requesting Party's territory, or
(ii) where the anticompetitive activities do have such an impact on the Requesting Party's
consumers, they occur principally in and are directed principally towards the other Party's
territory;
(b) The adverse effects on the interests of the Requesting Party can be and are likely to be fully
and adequately investigated and, as appropriate, eliminated or adequately remedied pursuant to
the laws, procedures, and available remedies of the Requested Party. The Parties recognize that
it may be appropriate to pursue separate enforcement activities where anticompetitive activities
affecting both territories justify the imposition of penalties within both jurisdictions; and
(c) The competition authorities of the Requested Party agree that in conducting their own
enforcement activities, they will:
(i) devote adequate resources to investigate the anticompetitive activities and, where
appropriate, promptly pursue adequate enforcement activities;
(ii) use their best efforts to pursue all reasonably available sources of information, including
such sources of information as may be suggested by the competition authorities of the
Requesting Party;
(iii) inform the competition authorities of the Requesting Party, on request or at reasonable
intervals, of the status of their enforcement activities and intentions, and where appropriate
provide to the competition authorities of the Requesting Party relevant confidential information
if consent has been obtained from the source concerned. The use and disclosure of such
information shall be governed by Article V;
(iv) promptly notify the competition authorities of the Requesting Party of any change in their
intentions with respect to investigation or enforcement;
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request defer or suspend enforcement action pending the enforcement
activities of the country to which the request is made. 160 The agreement also
contains a provision that outlines conditions under which the party making
the positive comity request will normally defer or suspend its antitrust
enforcement activities. 161
These provisions address the overarching weakness--that positive
comity is dependent on the requested country's laws-of the U.S.-Japan
Cooperation Agreement. By allowing deferral or suspension of enforcement
activities, the U.S.-EC Agreement limits the potential for unilateral
extraterritorial antitrust enforcement. However, the U.S.-EC Agreement still
allows unilateral actions. The agreement states that "[n]othing in this
Agreement precludes the competition authorities of a Requesting Party that
choose to defer or suspend independent enforcement activities from later
initiating or reinstituting such activities.' ' 162  Although unilateral actions are
(v) use their best efforts to complete their investigation and to obtain a remedy or initiate
proceedings within six months, or such other time as agreed to by the competition authorities of
the Parties, of the deferral or suspension of enforcement activities by the competition authorities
of the Requesting Party;
(vi) fully inform the competition authorities of the Requesting Party of the results of their
investigation, and take into account the views of the competition authorities of the Requesting
Party, prior to any settlement, initiation of proceedings, adoption of remedies, or termination of
the investigation; and
(vii) comply with any reasonable request that may be made by the competition authorities of the
Requesting Party.
When the above conditions are satisfied, a Requesting Party which chooses not to defer or
suspend its enforcement activities shall inform the competition authorities of the Requested
Party of its reasons.
3. The competition authorities of the Requesting Party may defer or suspend their own
enforcement activities if fewer than all of the conditions set out in paragraph 2 are satisfied.
4. Nothing in this Agreement precludes the competition authorities of a Requesting Party that
choose to defer or suspend independent enforcement activities from later initiating or
reinstituting such activities. In such circumstances, the competition authorities of the Requesting
Party will promptly inform the competition authorities of the Requested Party of their intentions
and reasons. If the competition authorities of the Requested Party continue with their own
investigation, the competition authorities of the two Parties shall, where appropriate, coordinate
their respective investigations under the criteria and procedures of Article IV of the 1991
Agreement.
EC Positive Comity Agreement, supra note 157, art. IV.
160 EC Positive Comity Agreement, supra note 157, art. IV. 1.
161 Id. art. IV.2.
162 Id. art. IV.4.
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not proscribed, the parties are under a duty to inform each -other of their
"intentions and reasons" for taking unilateral action.' 
63
Article IV of the U.S.-EC agreement also provides more structure to
the actual positive comity process by outlining a course of action to follow
for the party to which a request is made. A competition authority
responding to a positive comity request should: (1) devote adequate
resources to the investigation, (2) pursue all reasonable sources of
information, (3) regularly update the requesting party, and (4) take into
account the views of the requesting party throughout the process.164 The
supplement states that requested investigations should be completed within
six months.' 65 These provisions ensure that a positive comity request will be
enforced to the extent of the requested party's laws and establish some
expectations as to how the process will be carried out.
Finally, the U.S.-EC Agreement does not contain any provisions for
dissolution of the agreement or preemption by contradictory laws. Article
VIII provides that the agreement can be terminated with sixty days notice.
166
Furthermore, Article VII provides that nothing in the agreement will be
interpreted in a manner inconsistent with the existing laws of the United
States or the European Communities.
167
B. Practical Positive Comity Experience of the Sabre Corporation
The ICPAC Final Report also suggests adopting the recommendations
of Sabre, the only private party involved in a positive comity referral at the
date of the final report.'68 The ICPAC endorsed the followingrecommendations:
e Providing a realistic assessment at the outset of an investigation
whether the requested party can devote adequate resources to the
.i69investigation;
163 Id. art. IV.4.
'64 Id. art. IV.2.c.
161 Id. art. IV.2.c.v.
'66 Id. art. VII.2.
167 Id. art. ViI.
168 FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 239-40. Sabre is a U.S.-based airline reservation system that
lodged complaints with the DOJ against a European airlines reservation system in 1997. Id. at 232. Sabre
and the DOJ alleged that the European reservation system was denying Sabre the information it needed to
compete effectively. Id.
169 FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 240.
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o Updating private parties whose complaint is at issue to the degree
permitted by law; 170 and
o Establishing a timetable to complete the referral.
17 1
These recommendations ensure that the jurisdiction investigating a
complaint will vigorously pursue the case and keep the requesting parties
informed. 172 Perhaps the most important recommendation is to actually use
the positive comity provision in a real case so the process can be refined and
confidence can be established. 173 Nonetheless, the positive comity provision
as written does not preclude the unilateral application of U.S. antitrust laws,
even if the recommendations are followed.
C. Alternate Approaches to International Competition Law
One commentator has identified four approaches to international
competition law174 that may resolve the tension between the United States
and Japan. The first approach is the "complete international code with a
supranational enforcement agency." 1 75 The second approach involves the
"harmonization of national antitrust laws" and the "persistent coaxing of
national laws into identity, or near identity.' 76 This approach would include
uniform laws, modeled after the approach of the Uniform Commercial Code
in the United States. 177 Under the third approach, nations would develop
bilateral agreements, including agreements with positive comity provisions,
upon which they would build a framework of "minimum appropriate
competition rules, a binding positive comity instrument and an effective
dispute settlement instrument."'178 Finally, the fourth approach assumes that





'71 Id. at 239-41; CLP Report, supra note 127, at I 1-14.




171 Id. at 13-14.
19 Id. at 14. See also Orson Swindle, Enforcement of Consumer Protection and Competition Laws in
the Global Marketplace: The North American Experience, Speech before the Sydney Global Commerce
Conference 1998 (1998) (discussing the spectrum of approaches to international antitrust enforcement) (on
file with author).
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D. Summary of Weaknesses in the U.S. -Japan Positive Comity Agreement
and Recommendations for Improvement
Weaknesses in the U.S.-Japan Positive Comity Provision and several
recommendations for improvement are summarized in Table 2.
Table 2. Weaknesses in the U.S.-Japan Positive Comity Provision and
Recommendations for Improvement
Weaknesses of U.S.-Japan Positive Comity Recommendations for Improvement
Provision
Differences in Antitrust Laws * Incorporate the course of action
provisions from Article IV of the U.S.-
EC Positive Comity Agreement to
ensure that the requested party will
vigorously enforce its antitrust laws.
* Harmonization of antitrust laws.
Positive Comity is Voluntary * Use positive comity in real situations to
build trust and confidence.
Positive Comity is an Unproven Concept * Use positive comity in real situations to
build trust and confidence.
0 Incorporate the course of action and
time limit provisions from Article IV of
the U.S.-EC Positive Comity.
Agreement into the U.S.-Japan
Cooperation Agreement.
The Cooperation Agreement is Easily Dissolved * Make the Cooperation Agreement more
or Preempted by Contrary Law difficult to dissolve.
* Formalize the Cooperation Agreement
as a treaty.
* Harmonization of antitrust laws.
Presently, the harmonization of U.S. and Japanese antitrust laws is
unlikely. One significant obstacle is the United States' fear that
accommodating the antitrust laws of other countries would weaken its
relatively stringent antitrust laws. 180 Furthermore, "[e]limination of national
differences in the fundamental processes of law enforcement, ranging from
attorney fee arrangements to the jury system, is simply not feasible."' 181
What is possible, however, is "greater coordination and cooperation"
between competition authorities.' 82
7S0 Swindle, supra note 179.
18 John 0. Haley, Competition and Trade Policy: Antitrust Enforcement: Do Differences Matter?, in
ANTITRUST: A NEW INT'L TRADE REMEDY? 322 (1995).
182 Id.
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VII. CONCLUSION
The positive comity provision of the U.S.-Japan Cooperation
Agreement is important because it provides an alternative to unilateral
antitrust enforcement actions against Japanese firms, thereby allowing the
United States to raise market access concerns without infringing upon
Japanese sovereignty. Nonetheless, although the Cooperation Agreement's
positive comity provision is more comprehensive than in previous
agreements between the United States and Japan, positive comity has several
weaknesses. First, positive comity only allows enforcement to the extent
available under the laws of the country to which the enforcement request is
made. Second, both requests and responses to positive comity requests are
voluntary. Third, positive comity is a concept untested by the United States
and Japan. Finally, the parties or contrary national laws may easily void the
Cooperation Agreement itself. In short, the positive comity provision of the
Cooperation Agreement does not proscribe unilateral antitrust actions. This
leaves open the possibility that the United States will continue to take
unilateral action against Japanese firms rather than operating under the
positive comity provision.
To enhance positive comity, the ICPAC and commentators have made
several recommendations. The recommendations include strengthening the
positive comity provision itself and moving toward harmonization of
substantive antitrust laws. However, complete substantive harmonization is
impossible. Professor John 0. Haley of the Washington University School
of Law in St. Louis succinctly summarizes the inherent problem: "[N]o
proposal fully resolves the problems and conflicts of enforcement without
major reforms to reduce the fundamental differences that distinguish the
U.S. legal system from those of its trading partners. The best alternatives
are those that provide mechanisms to reduce and ameliorate conflicts."'
83
"' Id. at 324-25.
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